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Abstract
There are many examples in the literature that suggest that indistinguishability is in-
transitive, despite the fact that the indistinguishability relation is typically taken to be an
equivalence relation (and thus transitive). It is shown that if the uncertainty perception
and the question of when an agent reports that two things are indistinguishable are both
carefully modeled, the problems disappear, and indistinguishability can indeed be taken to
be an equivalence relation. Moreover, this model also suggests a logic of vagueness that
seems to solve many of the problems related to vagueness discussed in the philosophical
literature. In particular, it is shown here how the logic can handle the sorites paradox.
1 Introduction
While it seems that indistinguishability should be an equivalence relation and thus, in particu-
lar, transitive, there are many examples in the literature that suggest otherwise. For example,
tasters cannot distinguish a cup of coffee with one grain of sugar from one without sugar, nor,
more generally, a cup with n+ 1 grains of sugar from one with n grains of sugar. But they can
certainly distinguish a cup with 1,000 grains of sugar from one with no sugar at all.
∗Work supported in part by NSF under grant CTC-0208535, by ONR under grants N00014-00-1-03-41 and
N00014-01-10-511, by the DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program administered
by the ONR under grant N00014-01-1-0795, and by AFOSR under grant F49620-02-1-0101. A preliminary
version of this paper appears in Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the
Ninth International Conference (KR 2004).
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These intransitivities in indistinguishability lead to intransitivities in preference. For ex-
ample, consider someone who prefers coffee with a teaspoon of sugar to one with no sugar.
Since she cannot distinguish a cup with n grains from a cup with n + 1 grains, she is clearly
indifferent between them. Yet, if a teaspoon of sugar is 1,000 grains, then she clearly prefers a
cup with 1,000 grains to a cup with no sugar.
There is a strong intuition that the indistinguishability relation should be transitive, as
should the relation of equivalence on preferences. Indeed, transitivity is implicit in our use
of the word “equivalence” to describe the relation on preferences. Moreover, it is this intu-
ition that forms the basis of the partitional model for knowledge used in game theory (see, e.g.,
[Aumann 1976]) and in the distributed systems community [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995].
On the other hand, besides the obvious experimental observations, there have been arguments
going back to at least Poincare´ [1902] that the physical world is not transitive in this sense. In
this paper, I try to reconcile our intuitions about indistinguishability with the experimental ob-
servations, in a way that seems (at least to me) both intuitively appealing and psychologically
plausible. I then go on to apply the ideas developed to the problem of vagueness.
To understand the vagueness problem, consider the well-known sorites paradox: If n + 1
grains of sand make a heap, then so do n. But 1,000,000 grains of sand are clearly a heap, and
1 grain of sand does not constitute a heap. Let Heap to be a predicate such that Heap(n) holds
if n grains of sand make a heap. What is the extension of Heap? That is, for what subset of
natural numbers does Heap hold? Is this even well defined? Clearly the set of numbers for
which Heap holds is upward closed: if n grains of sand is a heap, then surely n + 1 grains of
sand is a heap. Similarly, the set of grains of sand which are not a heap is downward closed: if
n grains of sand is not a heap, then n−1 grains of sand is not a heap. However, there is a fuzzy
middle ground, which is in part the reason for the paradox. The relationship of the vagueness
of Heap to indistinguishability should be clear: n grains of sand are indistinguishable from
n+ 1 grains. Indeed, just as
Heap is a vague predicate, so is the predicate Sweet, where Sweet(n) holds if a cup of
coffee with n grains of sugar is sweet. So it is not surprising that an approach to dealing with
intransitivity has something to say about vagueness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I discuss my solution to the
intransitivity problem. In Section 3, I show how how this solution can be applied to the prob-
lem of vagueness. There is a huge literature on the vagueness problem. Perhaps the best-
known approach in the AI literature involves fuzzy logic, but fuzzy logic represents only a
small part of the picture; the number of recent book-length treatments, including [Keefe 2000;
Keefe and Smith 1996; Sorenson 2001; Williamson 1994], give a sense of the activity in the
area. I formalize the intuitions discussed in Section 2 using a logic for reasoning about vague
propositions, provide a sound a complete axiomatization for the logic, and show how it can
deal with problems like the sorites paradox. I compare my approach to vagueness to some of
the leading alternatives in Section 4. Finally, I conclude with some discussion in Section 5.
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2 Intransitivity
Clearly part of the explanation for the apparent intransitivity in the sugar example involves
differences that are too small to be detected. But this can’t be the whole story. To understand
the issues, imagine a robot with a simple sensor for sweetness. The robot “drinks” a cup of
coffee and measures how sweet it is. Further imagine that the robot’s sensor is sensitive only at
the 10-grain level. Formally, this means that a cup with 0–9 grains results in a sensor reading
of 0, 10–19 grains results in a sensor reading of 1, and so on. If the situation were indeed that
simple, then indistinguishability would in fact be an equivalence relation. All cups of coffee
with 0–9 grains of sugar would be indistinguishable, as would cups of coffee with 10–19 grains,
and so on. However, in this simple setting, a cup of coffee with 9 grains of sugar would be
distinguishable from cups with 10 grains.
To recover intransitivity requires two more steps. The first involves dropping the assump-
tion that the number of grains of sugar uniquely determines the reading of the sensor. There are
many reasons to drop this assumption. For one thing, the robot’s sensor may not be completely
reliable; for example, 12 grains of sugar may occasionally lead to a reading of 0; 8 grains may
lead to a reading of 1. A second reason is that the reading may depend in part on the robot’s
state. After drinking three cups of sweet coffee, the robot’s perception of sweetness may be
dulled somewhat, and a cup with 112 grains of sugar may result in a reading of 10. A third
reason may be due to problems in the robot’s vision system, so that the robot may “read” 1
when the sensor actually says 2. It is easy to imagine other reasons; the details do not matter
here. All that matters is what is done about this indeterminacy. This leads to the second step of
my “solution”.
To simplify the rest of the discussion, assume that the “indeterminacy” is less than 4 grains
of sugar, so that if there are actually n grains of sugar, the sensor reading is between ⌊(n −
4)/10⌋ and ⌊(n + 4)/10⌋.1 It follows that two cups of coffee with the same number of grains
may result in readings that are not the same, but they will be at most one apart. Moreover, two
cups of coffee which differ by one grain of sugar will also result in readings that differ by at
most one.
The robot is asked to compare the sweetness of cups, not sensor readings. Thus, we must
ask when the robot reports two cups of coffee as being of equivalent sweetness. Given the
indeterminacy of the reading, it seems reasonable that two cups of sugar that result in a sensor
reading that differ by no more than one are reported as indistinguishable, since they could have
come from cups of coffee with the same number of grains of sugar. It is immediate that reports
of indistinguishability will be intransitive, even if the sweetness readings themselves clearly
determine an equivalence relation. Indeed, if the number of grains in two cups of coffee differs
by one, then the two cups will be reported as equivalent. But if the number of grains differs by
at least eighteen, then they will be reported as inequivalent.
To sum up, reports of relative sweetness (and, more generally, reports about perceptions)
exhibit intransitivity; it may well be that there are three cups of sugar such that a and b are
1⌊x⌋, the floor of x, is the largest integer less than or equal to x. Thus, for example, ⌊3.2⌋ = 3.
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reported as being equivalent in sweetness, as are b and c, but c is reported as being sweeter than
a. Nevertheless, the underlying “perceived sweetness” relation can be taken to be transitive.
However, “perceived sweetness” must then be taken to be a relation on the taste of a cup of
coffee tried at a particular time, not on the number of grains of sugar in a cup. That is, rather
than considering a Sweeter-Than relation where Sweeter-Than(n, n′) holds if a cup of coffee
with n grains is sweeter than one with n′ grains of sugar, we should consider a Sweeter-Than′
relation, where Sweeter-Than′((c, s), (c′, s′)) holds if cup of coffee c tried by the agent in
(subjective) state s (where the state includes the time, and other features of the agent’s state,
such as how many cups of coffee she has had recently) is perceived as sweeter than cup of
coffee c′ tried by the agent in state s′. The former relation may not be transitive; the latter
is. But note that the latter relation does not completely determine when the agent reports c
as being sweeter than c′. Intransitivity in reports of perceptions does not necessarily imply
intransitivity in actual perceptions.
3 Vagueness
The term “vagueness” has been used somewhat vaguely in the literature. Roughly speaking,
a term is said to be vague if its use varies both between and within speakers. (According to
Williamson [1994], this interpretation of vagueness goes back at least to Peirce [1956], and
was also used by Black [1937] and Hempel [1939].) In the language of the previous section,
P is vague if, for some a, some agents may report P (a) while others may report ¬P (a) and,
indeed, the same agent may sometimes report P (a) and sometimes ¬P (a).
Vagueness has been applied to what seem to me to be two distinct, but related, phenomena.
For one thing, it has been applied to predicates like Red, where the different reports may be
attributed in part to there not being an objective notion of what counts as red. That is, two agents
looking at the same object (under the same lighting conditions) may disagree as to whether an
object is red, although typically they will agree. Vagueness is also applied to situations with
epistemic uncertainty, as in the case of a predicate Crowd, where Crowd(n) holds if there
are at least n people in a stadium at a particular time.2 Here there may be different responses
because agents have trouble estimating the size of a crowd. I present a model that distinguishes
these two sources of vagueness. Because vagueness is rather slippery, I also present a formal
logic of vagueness.
2Of course, there may still be objective uncertainty as to how to do the count. For example, does a pregnant
woman count as one or two? If the answer is “one”, then if she goes into labor, at what point does the answer
become “two”? The point is that even if we assume that all these details have been worked out, so that there would
be be complete agreement among all agents as to how many people are in the stadium if they had all the relevant
information, there will still in general be uncertainty as to how many people are in the stadium. This uncertainty
leads to vagueness.
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3.1 A Modal Logic of Vagueness: Syntax and Semantics
To reason about vagueness, I consider a modal logicLDRn with two families of modal operators:
R1, . . . , Rn, where Riϕ is interpreted as “agent i reports ϕ”, and D1, . . . , Dn, where Diϕ is
interpreted as “according to agent i, ϕ is definitely the case”. For simplicity, I consider only a
propositional logic; there are no difficulties extending to the first-order case. As the notation
makes clear, I allow multiple agents, since some issues regarding vagueness (in particular, the
fact that different agents may interpret a vague predicate differently) are best considered in a
multi-agent setting.
Start with a (possibly infinite) set of primitive propositions. More complicated formulas
are formed by closing off under conjunction, negation, and the modal operators R1, . . . , Rn
and D1, . . . , Dn.
A vagueness structureM has the form (W,P1, . . . , Pn, π1, . . . , πn), where Pi is a nonempty
subset of W for i = 1, . . . , n, and πi is an interpretation, which associates with each primitive
proposition a subset of W . Intuitively, Pi consists of the worlds that agent i initially considers
plausible. For those used to thinking probabilistically, the worlds in Pi can be thought of as
those that have prior probability greater than ǫ according to agent i, for some fixed ǫ ≥ 0.3 A
simple class of models is obtained by taking Pi = W for i = 1, . . . , n; however, as we shall see,
in the case of multiple agents, there are advantages to allowing Pi 6= W . Turning to the truth
assignments πi, note that it is somewhat nonstandard in modal logic to have a different truth
assignment for each agent; this different truth assignment is intended to capture the intuition
that the truth of formulas like Sweet is, to some extent, dependent on the agent, and not just on
objective features of the world.
I assume that W ⊆ O × S1 × . . . Sn, where O is a set of objective states, and Si is a set of
subjective states for agent i. Thus, worlds have the form (o, s1, . . . , sn). Agent i’s subjective
state si represents i’s perception of the world and everything else about the agent’s makeup
that determines the agent’s report. For example, in the case of the robot with a sensor, o
could be the actual number of grains of sugar in a cup of coffee and si could be the reading
on the robot’s sensor. Similarly, if the formula in question was Thin(TW) (“Tim Williamson
is thin”, a formula often considered in [Williamson 1994]), then o could represent the actual
dimensions of TW, and si could represent the agent’s perceptions. Note that si could also
include information about other features of the situation, such as the relevant reference group.
(Notions of thinness are clearly somewhat culture dependent and change over time; what counts
as thin might be very different if TW is a sumo wrestler.) In addition, si could include the
agent’s cutoff points for deciding what counts as thin, or what counts as red. In the case of the
robot discussed in Section 2, the subjective state could include its rule for deciding when to
3In general, the worlds that an agent considers plausible depends on the agent’s subjective state. That is why
I have been careful here to say that Pi consists of the worlds that agent i initially considers plausible. Pi should
be thought of as modeling the agent i’s prior beliefs, before learning whatever information led to the agent i to its
actual subjective state. It should shortly become clear how the model takes into account the fact that the agent’s
set of plausible worlds changes according to the agent’s subjective state.
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report something as sweet.4
If p is a primitive proposition then, intuitively, (o, s1, . . . , sn) ∈ πi(p) if i would consider
p true if i knew exactly what the objective situation was (i.e., if i knew o), given i’s possibly
subjective judgment of what counts as “p-ness”. Given this intuition, it should be clear that
all that should matter in this evaluation is the objective part of the world, o, and (possibly)
agent i’s subjective state, si. In the case of the robot, whether (o, s1, . . . , sn) ∈ πi(Sweet)
clearly depends on how many grains of sugar are in the cup of coffee, and may also depend
on the robot’s perception of sweetness and its cutoff points for sweetness, but does not depend
on other robots’ perceptions of sweetness. Note that the robot may give different answers in
two different subjective states, even if the objective state is the same and the robot knows the
objective state, since both its perceptions of sweetness and its cutoff point for sweetness may
be different in the two subjective states.
I write w ∼i w′ if w and w′ agree on agent i’s subjective state, and I write w ∼o w′ if
w and w′ agree on the objective part of the state. Intuitively, the ∼i relation can be viewed as
describing the worlds that agent i considers possible. Put another way, if w ∼i w′, then i cannot
distinguishw from w′, given his current information. Note that the indistinguishability relation
is transitive (indeed, it is an equivalence relation), in keeping with the discussion in Section 2.
I assume that πi depends only on the objective part of the state and i’s subjective state, so that
if w ∈ πi(p) for a primitive proposition p, and w ∼i w′ and w ∼o w′, then w′ ∈ πi(p). Note
that j’s state (for j 6= i) has no effect on i’s determination of the truth of p. There may be some
primitive propositions whose truth depends only on the objective part of the state (for example,
Crowd(n) is such a proposition). If p is such an objective proposition, then πi(p) = πj(p) for
all agents i and j, and, if w ∼o w′, then w ∈ πi(p) iff w′ ∈ πi(p).
I next define what it means for a formula to be true. The truth of formulas is relative to both
the agent and the world. I write (M,w, i) |= ϕ if ϕ is true according to agent i in world w. In
the case of a primitive proposition p,
(M,w, i) |= p iff w ∈ πi(p).
I define |= for other formulas by induction. For conjunction and negation, the definitions are
standard:
(M,w, i) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w, i) 6|= ϕ;
(M,w, i) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,w, i) |= ϕ and (M,w, i) |= ψ.
In the semantics for negation, I have implicitly assumed that, given the objective situation
and agent i’s subjective state, agent i is prepared to say, for every primitive proposition p,
whether or not p holds. Thus, if w /∈ πi(p), so that agent i would not consider p true given i’s
subjective state in w if i knew the objective situation at w, then I am assuming that i would
4This partition of the world into objective state and subjective states is based on the “runs and sys-
tems” framework introduced in [Halpern and Fagin 1989] (see [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for
motivation and discussion). The framework has been used to analyze problems ranging from dis-
tributed computing [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] to game theory [Halpern 1997] to belief revision
[Friedman and Halpern 1994]. More recently, it has been applied to the Sleeping Beauty problem [Halpern 2001].
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consider ¬p true in this world. This assumption is being made mainly for ease of exposition.
It would be easy to modify the approach to allow agent i to say (given the objective state and
i’s subjective state), either “p holds”, “p does not hold”, or “I am not prepared to say whether
p holds or p does not hold”.5 However, what I am explicitly avoiding here is taking a fuzzy-
logic like approach of saying something like “p is true to degree .3”. While the notion of
degree of truth is certainly intuitively appealing, it has other problems. The most obvious in
this context is where the .3 is coming from. Even if p is vague, the notion “p is true to degree
.3” is precise. It is not clear that introducing a continuum of precise propositions to replace the
vague proposition p really solves the problem of vagueness. Having said that, there is a natural
connection between the approach I am about to present and fuzzy logic; see Section 4.2.
Next, I consider the semantics for the modal operators Rj , j = 1, . . . , n. Recall that Rjϕ
is interpreted as “agent j reports ϕ. Formally, I take Rjϕ to be true if ϕ is true at all plausible
states j considers possible. Thus, taking Rj(ϕ) = {w′ : w ∼j w′},
(M,w, i) |= Rjϕ iff (M,w′, j) |= ϕ for all w′ ∈ Rj(w′) ∩ Pj.
Of course, for a particular formula ϕ, an agent may neither report ϕ nor ¬ϕ. An agent may
not be willing to say either that TW is thin or that TW is not thin. Note that, effectively, the
set of plausible states according to agent j given the agent’s subjective state in world w can
be viewed as the worlds in in Pj that are indistinguishable to agent j from w. Essentially, the
agent j is updating the worlds that she initially considers plausible by intersecting them with
the worlds she considers possible, given her subjective state at world w. If Pj = W for all
agents j = 1, . . . , n, then it is impossible for agents to give conflicting reports; that is, the
formula Riϕ ∧ ¬Rjϕ would be inconsistent. By considering only the plausible worlds when
giving the semantics for Rj , it is consistent to have conflicting reports.
Finally, ϕ is definitely true at state w if the truth of ϕ is determined by the objective state at
w:
(M,w, i) |= Djϕ iff (M,w′, j) |= ϕ for all w′ such that w ∼o w′.
A formula is said to be agent-independent if its truth is independent of the agent. That is,
ϕ is agent-independent if, for all worlds w,
(M,w, i) |= ϕ iff (M,w, j) |= ϕ.
As we observed earlier, objective primitive propositions (whose truth depends only on the
objective part of a world) are agent-independent; it is easy to see that formulas of the form
Djϕ and Rjϕ are as well. If ϕ is agent-independent, then I often write (M,w) |= ϕ rather than
(M,w, i) |= ϕ.
5The resulting logic would still be two-valued; the primitive proposition p would be replaced by a family of
three primitive propositions, py, pn, and p?, corresponding to “p holds”, “p does not hold”, and “I am not prepared
to say whether p holds or does not hold”, with a semantic requirement (which becomes an axiom in the complete
axiomatization) stipulating that exactly one proposition in each such family holds at each world.
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3.2 A Modal Logic of Vagueness: Axiomatization and Complexity
It is easy to see that Rj satisfies the axioms and rules of the modal logic KD45.6 It is also
easy to see that Dj satisfies the axioms of KD45. It would seem that, in fact, Dj should satisfy
the axioms of S5, since its semantics is determined by ∼j , which is an equivalence relation.
This is not quite true. The problem is with the so-called truth axiom of S5, which, in this
context, would say that anything that is definitely true according to agent j is true. This would
be true if there were only one agent, but is not true with many agents, because of the different
πi operators.
To see the problem, suppose that p is a primitive proposition. It is easy to see that (M,w, i) |=
Dip ⇒ p for all worlds w. However, it is not necessarily the case that (M,w, i) |= Djp ⇒ p
if i 6= j. Just because, according to agent i, p is definitely true according to agent j, it does
not follow that p is true according to agent i. What is true in general is that Djϕ⇒ ϕ is valid
for agent-independent formulas. Unfortunately, agent independence is a semantic property. To
capture this observation as an axiom, we need a syntactic condition sufficient to ensure that a
formula is necessarily agent independent. I observed earlier that formulas of the form Rjϕ and
Djϕ are agent-independent. It is immediate that Boolean combination of such formulas are
also agent-independent. Say that a formula is necessarily agent-independent if it is a Boolean
combination of formulas of the form Rjϕ and Dj′ϕ′ (where the agents in the subscripts may
be the same or different). Thus, for example, (¬R1D2p ∧ D1p) ∨ R2p is necessarily agent-
independent. Clearly, whether a formula is necessarily agent-independent depends only on the
syntactic form of the formula. Moreover, Djϕ ⇒ ϕ is valid for formulas that are necessarily
agent-independent. However, this axiom does not capture the fact that (M,w, i) |= Diϕ ⇒ ϕ
for all worlds w. Indeed, this fact is not directly expressible in the logic, but something some-
what similar is. For arbitrary formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, note that at least one of Diϕ1 ⇒ ϕ1, . . . ,
Dnϕn ⇒ ϕn must be true respect to each triple (M,w, i), i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, the formula
(D1ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (Dnϕn ⇒ ϕn) is valid. This additional property turns out to be exactly
what is needed to provide a complete axiomatization.
Let AX be the axiom system that consists of the following axioms Taut, R1–R4, and D1–
D6, and rules of inference NecR, NecD, and MP:
Taut. All instances of propositional tautologies.
R1. Rj(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (Rjϕ⇒ Rjψ).
R2. Rjϕ⇒ RjRjϕ.
R3. ¬Rjϕ⇒ Rj¬Rjϕ.
R4. ¬Rj(false).
6For modal logicians, perhaps the easiest way to see this is to observe a relation Rj on worlds can be defined
consisting of all pairs (w,w′) such that w ∼j w′ and w′ ∈ Pj . This relation, which characterizes the modal
operator Rj , is easily seen to be Euclidean and transitive, and thus determines a modal operator satisfying the
axioms of KD45.
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D1. Dj(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (Djϕ⇒ Djψ).
D2. Djϕ⇒ DjDjϕ.
D3. ¬Djϕ⇒ Dj¬Djϕ.
D4. ¬Dj(false).
D5. Djϕ⇒ ϕ if ϕ is necessarily agent-independent.
D6. (D1ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ1) ∨ . . . ∨ (Dnϕn ⇒ ϕn).
NecR. From ϕ infer Rjϕ.
NecD. From ϕ infer Djϕ.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
Using standard techniques of modal logic, it is can be shown that AX characterizes LDRn .
Theorem 3.1: AX is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to vagueness structures
for the language LDRn .
This shows that the semantics that I have given implicitly assumes that agents have per-
fect introspection and are logically omniscient. Introspection and logical omniscience are both
strong requirements. There are standard techniques in modal logic that make it possible to
give semantics to Rj that is appropriate for non-introspective agents. With more effort, it is
also possible to avoid logical omniscience. (See, for example, the discussion of logical omni-
science in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995].) In any case, very little of my treatment
of vagueness depends on these properties of Rj .
The complexity of the validity and satisfiability problem for theLDRn can also be determined
using standard techniques.
Theorem 3.2: For all n ≥ 1, determining the problem of determining the validity (or satisfia-
bility) of formulas in LDRn is PSPACE-complete.
Proof: The validity and satisfiability problems for KD45 and S5 in the case of two or more
agents is known to be PSPACE-complete [Halpern and Moses 1992]. The modal operators Rj
and Dj act essentially like KD45 and S5 operators, respectively. Thus, even if there is only one
agent, there are two modal operators, and a straightforward modification of the lower bound
argument in [Halpern and Moses 1992] gives the PSPACE lower bound. The techniques of
[Halpern and Moses 1992] also give the upper bound, for any number of agents.
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3.3 Capturing Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox
Although I have described this logic as one for capturing features of vagueness, the question
still remains as to what it means to say that a proposition ϕ is vague. I suggested earlier that a
standard view has been to take ϕ to be vague if, in some situations, some agents report ϕ while
others report ¬ϕ, or if the same agent may sometimes report ϕ and sometimes report ¬ϕ in
the same situation. Both intuitions can be captured in the logic. It is perfectly consistent that
(M,w) |= Riϕ∧Rj¬ϕ if i 6= j; that is, the logic makes it easy to express that two agents may
report different things regarding ϕ. Note that this depends critically on the fact that what agent
i reports depends only on the worlds in Pi that agent i considers plausible. Riϕ ∧ Rj¬ϕ holds
only at a world w where Pi ∩Ri(w) ∩ Pj ∩Rj(w) = ∅. This cannot happen if Pi = Pj = W ,
since then w ∈ Ri(w) ∩ Rj(w). Expressing the second intuition requires a little more care;
it is certainly not consistent to have (M,w) |= Rjϕ ∧ ¬Rjϕ. However, a more reasonable
interpretation of the second intuition is to say that in the same objective situation, an agent i
may both report ϕ and ¬ϕ. It is certainly consistent that there are two worlds w and w′ such
As a consequence, (M,w) |= ¬DjRjϕ. This statement just says that the objective world does
not determine an agent’s report. In particular, a formula such as ϕ ∧ ¬DjRjϕ is consistent; if
ϕ is true then an agent will not necessarily report it as true. This can be viewed as one of the
hallmarks of vagueness. I return to this point in Section 4.5.
Having borderline cases has often taken to be a defining characteristic of vague predicates.
Since I am considering a two-valued logic, propositions do not have borderline cases: at every
world, either ϕ is true or it is false. However, it is not the case that ϕ is either definitely true or
false. That is, there are borderline cases between Dϕ and D¬ϕ.
Although the logic and the associated semantics can capture features of vagueness, the
question still remains as to whether it gives any insight into the problems associated with
vagueness. I defer the discussion of some of the problems (e.g., higher-order vagueness) to
Section 4. Here I show how it can deal with the sorites paradox. Before going into details, it
seems to me that there should be two components to a solution to the sorites paradox. The first
is to show where the reasoning that leads to the paradox goes wrong in whatever formalism is
being used. The second is to explain why, nevertheless, the argument seems so reasonable and
natural to most people.
The sorites paradox is typically formalized as follows:
1. Heap(1,000,000).
2. ∀n > 1(Heap(n)⇒ Heap(n− 1)).
3. ¬Heap(1).
It is hard to argue with statements 1 and 3, so the obvious place to look for a problem is in state-
ment 2, the inductive step. And, indeed, most authors have, for various reasons, rejected this
step (see, for example, [Dummett 1975; Sorenson 2001; Williamson 1994] for typical discus-
sions). As I suggested in the introduction, it appears that rejecting the inductive step requires
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committing to the existence of an n such that n grains of sand is a heap and n−1 is not. While
I too reject the inductive step, it does not follow that there is such an n in the framework I have
introduced here, because I do not assume an objective notion of heap (whose extension is the
set of natural numbers n such that n grains of sands form a heap). What constitutes a heap
in my framework depends not only on the objective aspects of the world (i.e., the number of
grains of sand), but also on the agent and her subjective state.
To be somewhat more formal, assume for simplicity that there is only one agent. Consider
models where the objective part of the world includes the number of grains of sand in a par-
ticular pile of sand being observed by the agent, and the agent’s subjective state includes how
many times the agent has been asked whether a particular pile of sand constitutes a heap. What
I have in mind here is that the sand is repeatedly added to or removed from the pile, and each
time this is done, the agent is asked “Is this a heap?”. Of course, the objective part of the world
may also include the shape of the pile and the lighting conditions, while the agent’s subjective
state may include things like the agent’s sense perception of the pile under some suitable rep-
resentation. Exactly what is included in the objective and subjective parts of the world do not
matter for this analysis.
In this setup, rather than being interested in whether a pile of n grains of sand constitutes
a heap, we are interested in the question of whether, when viewing a pile of n grains of sand,
the agent would report that it is a heap. That is, we are interested in the formula S(n), which I
take to be an abbreviation of Pile(n)⇒ R(Heap). The formula Pile(n) is true at a world w if,
according to the objective component of w, there are in fact n grains of sand in the pile. Note
that Pile is not a vague predicate at all, but an objective statement about the number of grains
of sand present.7 By way of contrast, Heap is vague; its truth depends on both the objective
situation (how many grains of sand there actually are) and the agent’s subjective state.
There is no harm in restricting to models where S(1, 000, 000) holds in all worlds and S(1)
is false in all worlds where the pile actually does consist of one grain of sand. If there are
actually 1,000,000 grains of sand in the pile, then the agent’s subjective state is surely such that
she would report that there is a heap; and if there is actually only one grain of sand, then the
agent would surely report that there is not a heap. We would get the paradox if the inductive
step, ∀n > 1(S(n)⇒ S(n−1)) holds in all worlds. However, it does not, for reasons that have
nothing to do with vagueness. Note that in each world, Pile(n) holds for exactly one value of
n. Consider a world w where there is 1 grain of sand in the pile and take n = 2. Then S(2)
holds vacuously (because its antecedent Pile(2) is false), while S(1) is false, since in a world
with 1 grain of sand, by assumption, the agent reports that there is not a heap.
The problem here is that the inductive statement ∀n > 1(S(n) ⇒ S(n − 1)) does not
correctly capture the intended inductive argument. Really what we mean is more like “if there
are n grains of sand and the agent reports a heap, then when one grain of sand is removed, the
agent will still report a heap”.
Note that removing a grain of sand changes both the objective and subjective components
7While I am not assuming that the agent knows the number of grains of sand present, it would actually not
affect my analysis at all if the agent was told the exact number.
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of the world. It changes the objective component because there is one less grain of sand; it
changes the subjective component even if the agent’s sense impression of the pile remains the
same, because the agent has been asked one more question regarding piles of sand. The change
in the agent’s subjective state may not be uniquely determined, since the agent’s perception of
a pile of n − 1 grains of sand is not necessarily always the same. But even if it is uniquely
determined, the rest of my analysis holds. In any case, given that the world changes, a reason-
able reinterpretation of the inductive statement might be “For all worlds w, if there are n grains
of sand in the pile in w, and the agent reports that there is a heap in w, then the agent would
report that there is a heap in all the worlds that may result after removing one grain of sand.”
This reinterpretation of the inductive hypothesis cannot be expressed in the logic, but the logic
could easily be extended with dynamic-logic like operators so as to be able to express it, using
a formula such as
Pile(n) ∧ R(Heap)⇒ [remove 1 grain](Pile(n− 1) ∧ R(Heap).
Indeed, with this way of expressing the inductive step, there is no need to include Pile(n) or
Pile(n− 1) in the formula; it suffices to write R(Heap)⇒ [remove 1 grain]R(Heap).
Is this revised inductive step valid? Again, it is not hard to see it is not. Consider a world
where there is a pile of 1,000,000 grains of sand, and the agent is asked for the first time
whether this is a heap. By assumption, the agent reports that it is. As more and more grains of
sand are removed, at some point the agent (assuming that she has the patience to stick around
for all the questions) is bound to say that it is no longer a heap.8
Although the framework makes it clear that the induction fails (as it does in other ap-
proaches to formulating the problem), the question still remains as to why people accept the
inductive argument so quickly. One possible answer may be that it is “almost always” true,
although making this precise would require having a probability measure or some other mea-
sure of uncertainty on possible worlds. While this may be part of the answer, I think there is
another, more natural explanation. When people are asked the question, they do not consider
worlds where they have been asked the question many times before. They are more likely to
interpret it as “If, in a world where I have before never been asked whether there is a heap, I
report that there is a heap, then I will still report that there is a heap after one grain of sand
is removed.” Observe that this interpretation of the induction hypothesis is consistent with the
agent always reporting that a pile of 1,000,000 grains of sand is a heap and always reporting
that a pile of 1 grain is not a heap. More importantly, I suspect that the inductive hypothesis is
in fact empirically true. After an agent has invested the “psychic energy” to determine whether
there is a heap for the first time, it seems to me quite likely that she will not change her mind
after one grain of sand is removed. While this will not continue to be true as more and more
grains of sand are removed, it does not seem to me that this is not what people think of when
they answer the question.
8There may well be an in-between period where the agent is uncomfortable about having to decide whether
the pile is a heap. As I observed earlier, the semantics implicitly assumes that the agent is willing to answer all
questions with a “Yes” or “No”, but it is easy to modify things so as to allow “I’m not prepared to say”. The
problem of vagueness still remains: At what point does the agent first start to say “I’m not prepared to say”?
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Graff [2000] points out that a solution to the sorites paradox that denies the truth of the
inductive step, then it must deal with three problems:
• The semantic question: If the inductive step is not true, is its negation true? If so, then
is there a sharp boundary where the inductive step fails? If not, then what revision of
classical logic must be made to accommodate this fact?
• The epistemological question: If the inductive step is not true, why are we unable to say
which one of its instances is not true?
• The psychological question: If the inductive step is not true, then why are we so inclined
to accept it?
I claim that the solution I have presented here handles all these problems well. As we have
seen, the semantic question is dealt with since there is no sharp boundary, in the sense that
(in the case of the sorites paradox) there is an n such that an agent will always say that n is a
heap and n− 1 is not (although the underlying logic presented here is two-valued). As for the
epistemological question, we cannot say which instances of the inductive step are true because
the truth of a particular step depends on the agent’s subjective state. A particular instance might
be true in one subjective state and not another. Moreover, as I pointed out in the discussion of
intransitivity, the response may not even be a deterministic function of the agent’s state. This
makes it impossible to say exactly how an agent will respond to a particular sorites sequence.
Finally, I have given an argument as to why we are inclined to accept the truth of the inductive
step, which depends on a claim of how the statement is interpreted.
4 Relations to Other Approaches
In this section I consider how the approach to vagueness sketched in the previous section is
related to other approaches to vagueness that have been discussed in the literature.
4.1 Context-Dependent Approaches
My approach for dealing with the sorites paradox is perhaps closest to what Graff [2000] has
called context-dependent approaches, where the truth of a vague predicate depends on context.
The “context” in my approach can be viewed as a combination of the objective state and the
agent’s subjective state. Although a number of papers have been written on this approach (see,
for example, [Graff 2000; Kamp 1975; Soames 1999]), perhaps the closest in spirit to mine is
that of Raffman [1994].
In discussing sorites-like paradoxes, Raffmman considers a sequence of colors going grad-
ually from red to orange, and assumes that to deal with questions like “if patch n is red, then
so is patch n− 1”, the agent makes pairwise judgments. She observes that it seems reasonable
that an agent will always place patches n and n+1, judged at the same time, in same category
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(both red, say, or both orange). However, it is plausible that patch n will be assigned different
colors when paired with n − 1 than when paired with n + 1. This observation (which I agree
is likely to be true) is easily accommodated in the framework that I have presented here: If
the agent’s subjective state includes the perception of two adjacent color patches, and she is
asked to assign both a color, then she will almost surely assign both the same color. Raffman
also observes that the color judgment may depend on the colors that have already been seen as
well as other random features (for example, how tired/bored the agent is), although she does
not consider the specific approach to the sorites paradox that I do (i.e., the interpretation of the
inductive step of the paradox as “if, the first time I am asked, I report that P (n) holds, then I
will also report that P (n− 1) holds if asked immediately afterwards”).
However, none of the context-dependent approaches use a model that explicitly distin-
guishes the objective features of the world from the subjective features of a world. Thus, they
cannot deal with the interplay of the “definitely” and “reports that” operators, which plays a
significant role in my approach. By and large, they also seem to ignore issues of higher-order
vagueness, which are well dealt with by this interplay (see Section 4.4).
4.2 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic [Zadeh 1975] seems like a natural approach to dealing with vagueness, since it
does not require a predicate be necessarily true or false; rather, it can be true to a certain
degree. As I suggested earlier, this does not immediately resolve the problem of vagueness,
since a statement like “this cup of coffee is sweet to degree .8” is itself a crisp statement, when
the intuition suggests it should also be vague.
Although I have based my approach on a two-valued logic, there is a rather natural con-
nection between my approach and fuzzy logic. We can take the degree of truth of a formula
ϕ in world w to be the fraction of agents i such that (M,w, i) |= ϕ. We expect that, in most
worlds, the degree of truth of a formula will be close to either 0 or 1. We can have meaningful
communication precisely because there is a large degree of agreement in how agents interpret
subjective notions thinness, tallness, sweetness.
Note that the degree of truth of ϕ in (o, s1, . . . , sn) does not depend just on o, since
s1, . . . , sn are not deterministic functions of o. But if we assume that each objective situa-
tion o determines a probability distribution on tuples (s1, . . . , sn), then if n is large, for many
predicates of interest (e.g., Thin, Sweet, Tall), I expect that, as an empirical matter, the distri-
bution will be normally distributed with a very small variance. In this case, the degree of truth
of such a predicate in an objective situation o can be taken to be the expected degree of truth of
P , taken over all worlds (o, s1, . . . , sn) whose first component is o.
This discussion shows that my approach to vagueness is compatible with assigning a degree
of truth in the interval [0, 1] to vague propositions, as is done in fuzzy logic. Moreover non-
vague propositions (called crisp in the fuzzy logic literature) get degree of truth either 0 or
1. However, while this is a way of giving a natural interpretation to degrees of truth, and it
supports the degree of truth of ¬ϕ being 1 minus the degree of truth of ϕ, as is done in fuzzy
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logic, it does not support the semantics for ∧ typically taken in fuzzy logic, where the degree
of truth of ϕ ∧ ψ is taken to be the minimum of the degree of truth of ϕ and the degree of
truth of ψ. Indeed, under my interpretation of degree of truth, there is no functional connection
between the degree of truth of ϕ, ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ
4.3 Supervaluations
TheD operator also has close relations to the notion of supervaluations [Fine 1975; van Fraassen 1968].
Roughly speaking, the intuition behind supervaluations is that language is not completely pre-
cise. There are various ways of “extending” a world to make it precise. A formula is then taken
to be true at a world w under this approach if it is true under all ways of extending the world.
Both the Rj and Di operators have some of the flavor of supervaluations. If we consider just
the objective component of a world o, there are various ways of extending it with subjective
components (s1, . . . , sn). Diϕ is true at an objective world o if (M,w, i) |= ϕ for all worlds w
that extend o. (Note that the truth of Djϕ depends only on the objective component of a world.)
Similarly, given just a subjective component sj of a world, Rjϕ is true of sj if (M,w, i) |= ϕ
for all worlds that extend si. Not surprisingly, properties of supervaluations can be expressed
using Rj or Dj . Bennett [1998] has defined a modal logic that formalizes the supervaluation
approach.
4.4 Higher-Order Vagueness
In many approaches towards vagueness, there has been discussion of higher-order vagueness
(see, for example, [Fine 1975; Williamson 1994]). In the context of the supervaluation ap-
proach, we can say that Dϕ (“definitely ϕ”) holds at a world w if ϕ is true in all extensions of
w. Then Dϕ is not vague; at each world, either Dϕ or ¬Dϕ (and D¬Dϕ) is true (in the super-
valuation sense). But using this semantics for definitely, it seems that there is a problem. For
under this semantics, “definitely ϕ” implies “definitely definitely ϕ” (for essentially the same
reasons that Diϕ ⇒ DiDiϕ in the semantics that I have given). But, goes the argument, this
does not allow the statement “This is definitely red” to be vague. A rather awkward approach is
taken to dealing with this by Fine [1975] (see also [Williamson 1994]), which allows different
levels of interpretation.
I claim that the real problem is that higher-order vagueness should not be represented using
the modal operator D in isolation. Rather, a combination of D and R should be used. It is
not interesting particularly to ask when it is definitely the case that it is definitely the case that
something is red. This is indeed true exactly if it is definitely red. What is more interesting
is when it is definitely the case that agent i would report that an object is definitely red. This
is represented by the formula DiRiDiRed. We can iterate and ask when i would report that
it is definitely the case that he would report that it is definitely the case that he would report
it is definitely red, i.e., when DiRiDiRiDiRed holds, and so on. It is easy to see that DiRip
does not imply DiRiDiRip; lower-order vagueness does not imply higher-order vagueness.
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Since I have assumed that agents are introspective, it can be shown that higher-order vagueness
implies lower-order vagueness. In particular, DiRiDiRiϕ does imply DiRiϕ. (This follows
using the fact that Diϕ ⇒ ϕ and RiRiϕ ⇒ Riϕ are both valid.) The bottom line here is that
by separating the R and D operators in this way, issues of higher-order vagueness become far
less vague.
4.5 Williamson’s Approach
One of the leading approaches to vagueness in the recent literature is that of Williamson; see
[Williamson 1994, Chapters 7 and 8] for an introduction. Williamson considers an epistemic
approach, viewing vagueness as ignorance. Very roughly speaking, he uses “know” where I
use “report”. However, he insists that it cannot be the case that if you know something, then
you know you know it, whereas my notion of reporting has the property that Ri implies RiRi.
It is instructive to examine the example that Williamson uses to argue that you cannot know
what you know, to see where his argument breaks down in the framework I have presented.
Williamson considers a situation where you look at a crowd and do not know the number
of people in it. He makes what seem to be a number of reasonable assumptions. Among them
is the following:
I know that if there are exactly n people, then I do not know that there are not
exactly n− 1 people.
This may not hold in my framework. This is perhaps easier to see if we think of a robot with
sensors. If there are n grains of sugar in the cup, it is possible that a sensor reading compatible
with n grains will preclude there being n−1 grains. For example, suppose that, as in Section 2,
if there are n grains of sugar, and the robot’s sensor reading is between ⌊(n − 4)/10⌋ and
⌊(n + 4)/10⌋. If there are in fact 16 grains of sugar, then the sensor reading could be 2
(= ⌊(16 + 4)/10⌋). But if the robot knows how its sensor works, then if its sensor reading
is 2, then it knows that if there are exactly 16 grains of sand, then (it knows that) there are
not exactly 15 grains of sugar. Of course, it is possible to change the semantics of Ri so as
to validate Williamson’s assumptions. But this point seems to be orthogonal to dealing with
vagueness.
Quite apart from his treatment of epistemic matters, Williamson seems to implicitly assume
that there is an objective notion of what I have been calling subjectively vague notions, such as
red, sweet, and thin. This is captured by what he calls the supervenience thesis, which roughly
says that if two worlds agree on their objective part, then they must agree on how they interpret
what I have called subjective propositions. Williamson focuses on the example of thinness,
in which case his notion of supervenience implies that “If x has exactly the same physical
measurements in a possible situation s and y has in a possible situation t, then x is thin in s if
and only if y is thin in t” [Williamson 1994, p. 203]. I have rejected this viewpoint here, since,
for me, whether x is this depends also on the agent’s subjective state. Indeed, rejecting this
viewpoint is a central component of my approach to intransitivity and vagueness.
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Despite these differences, there is one significant point of contact between Williamson’s
approach and that presented here. Williamson suggests modeling vagueness using a modal
operator C for clarity. Formally, he takes a model M to be a quadruple (W, d, α, π), where W
is a set of worlds and π is an interpretation as above (Williamson seems to implicitly assume
that there is a single agent), where d is a metric onW (so that d is a symmetric function mapping
W ×W to [0,∞) such that d(w,w′) = 0 iff w = w′ and d(w1, w2) + d(w2, w3) ≤ d(w1, w3)),
and α is a non-negative real number. The semantics of formulas is defined in the usual way;
the one interesting clause is that for C:
(M,w) |= Cϕ iff (M,w′) |= ϕ for all w′ such that d(w,w′) ≤ α.
Thus, Cϕ is true at a world w if ϕ is true at all worlds within α of w.
The intuition for this model is perhaps best illustrated by considering it in the framework
discussed in the previous section, assuming that there is only one proposition, say Tall(TW),
and one agent. Suppose that Tall(TW) is taken to hold if TW is above some threshold height
t∗. Since Tall(TW) is the only primitive proposition, we can take the objective part of a world
to be determined by the actual height of TW. For simplicity, assume that the agent’s subjective
state is determined by the agent’s subjective estimate of TW’s height (perhaps as a result of a
measurement). Thus, a world can be taken to be a tuple (t, t′), where t is TW’s height and t′
is the agent’s subjective estimate of the height. Suppose that the agent’s estimate is within α/2
of TW’s actual height, so that the set W of possible worlds consists of all pairs (t, t′) such that
|t− t′| ≤ α/2. Assume that all worlds are plausible (so that P = W ). It is then easy to check
that (M, (t, t′)) |= DR(Tall(TW)) iff t ≥ t∗ + α. That is, the agent will definitely say that
TW is Tall iff TW’s true height is at least α more than the threshold t∗ for tallness, since in such
worlds, the agent’s subjective estimate of TW’s height is guaranteed to be at least t∗ + α/2.
To connect this to Williamson’s model, suppose that the metric d is such that d((t, t′), (u, u′)) =
|t− u|; that is, the distance between worlds is taken to be the difference between TW’s actual
height in these worlds. Then it is immediate that (M, (t, t′)) |= C(Tall(TW)) iff t ≥ t∗ + α.
In fact, a more general statement is true. By definition, (M, (t, t′)) |= Cϕ iff (M, (u, u′)) |= ϕ
for all (u, u′) ∈ W such that |t − u| ≤ α. It is easy to check that (M, (t, t′)) |= DRϕ iff
(M, (u, u′)) |= ϕ for all (u, u′) ∈ W such that |t − u′| ≤ α/2. Finally, a straightforward
calculcation shows that, for a fixed t,
{u : ∃u′((u, u′) ∈ W, |t− u| ≤ α)} = {u : ∃u′((u, u′) ∈ W, |t− u′| ≤ α/2)}.
Thus, if ϕ is a formula whose truth depends just on the objective part of the world (as is the
case for Tall(TW) as I have defined it) then (M, (t, t′)) |= Cϕ iff (M, (t, t′) |= DRϕ.
Williamson suggests that a proposition ϕ should be taken to be vague if ϕ ∧ ¬Cϕ is sat-
isfiable. In Section 3, I suggested that ϕ ∧ ¬DRϕ could be taken as one of the hallmarks of
vagueness. Thus, I can capture much the same intuition for vagueness as Williamson by using
DR instead of C, without having to make what seem to me unwarranted epistemic assump-
tions.
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5 Discussion
I have introduced what seems to me a natural approach to dealing with intransitivity of pref-
erence and vagueness. Although various pieces of the approach seem certainly have appeared
elsewhere, it seems that this particular packaging of the pieces is novel. The approach leads to
a straightforward logic of vagueness, while avoiding many of the problems that have plagued
other approaches. In particular, it gives what I would argue is a clean solution to the seman-
tic, epistemic, and psychological problems associated with vagueness, while being able to deal
with higher-order vagueness.
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